Singapore Court of Appeal clarifies principles relating to limitation period for enforcement of arbitral awards

25 May 2026

Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd v South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] SGCA 20 

In Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd v South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation), the Singapore Court of Appeal clarified that the six-year limitation period for the enforcement of an arbitral award under section 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act 1959 (“LA”) starts to run from the date when the award debtor fails to honour the award, and not from the date of the award. 

Facts 

In 2017, the respondent, a protection and indemnity club which provided insurance coverage for third party liabilities arising out of shipping operations carried out on behalf of its insured members, commenced an arbitration against the appellant, a shipping agent, for its failure to pay certain calls and supplementary calls made in accordance with the respondent’s Rules of Association. 

On 17 July 2019, the arbitrator issued an award (“Award”) which provided that the appellant was to pay certain sums to the respondent. The appellant did not satisfy the Award. 

Under section 6(1)(c) of the LA, an action to enforce an award shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 

On 15 July 2025, nearly six years after the Award was issued, the respondent filed an application in the Singapore High Court for permission to recognise and enforce the Award (“Recognition Application”) pursuant to the International Arbitration Act 1994. The next day, on 16 July 2025, the High Court granted the respondent permission to recognise and enforce the Award (“Recognition Order”), and entered judgment against the appellant in terms of the Award. The terms of the High Court’s order also provided that the said judgment was only enforceable 14 days after the service of the order on the appellant. This was to allow time for the appellant to apply to set aside the order if it so wished. 

On 8 August 2025, the appellant filed an application to set aside the Recognition Order, or for the enforcement of the Award to be refused, arguing, among other things, that enforcement of the Award was time-barred under section 6(1)(c) of the LA. The High Court rejected the appellant’s arguments and found that the Recognition Application was brought within the six-year limitation period. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. 

When time stops to run under section 6(1)(c) of the LA 

The Court of Appeal clarified that the limitation period stops running when the action is brought, i.e. commenced. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the appellant’s interpretation that time should continue to run until after the Recognition Order has been served or the time limit to apply to set aside the Recognition Order has expired, noting that the appellant’s interpretation would introduce an untenable measure of uncertainty in determining when time stopped running and would encourage defendants to try to run down the clock by evading service. 

Since the Recognition Application was brought on 15 July 2025, which was before the expiry of the six-year limitation period under section 6(1)(c) of the LA, the Court of Appeal found that the said action to enforce the Award was not time-barred. 

When time starts to run 

The Court of Appeal also took the opportunity to clarify that time for calculating the six-year limitation period under the LA starts to run from the date when the award debtor fails to honour the award and not from the date of the award. 

The Court of Appeal stated that a party against whom an award is made can be understood as coming under an immediate obligation to pay the amount of the award. Strictly construed, this obligation is a liquidated debt obligation, as opposed to a claim for damages for breach of the implied promise to pay, the latter of which would only accrue after a reasonable period is allowed for the necessary payment to be made. 

That being the case, the award debtor would typically be in default of the award if it is not paid upon its issuance. This default starting time, however, can be displaced when the award itself specifies a different date for the performance of the award. In the absence of any deferred time for the performance of the award, the award is immediately due upon issuance and hence the award debtor would be deemed to have failed to honour the award. Accordingly, the date on which the award is not honoured would typically coincide with the date on which the award is issued. The Court of Appeal explained that this construction promotes clarity and certainty while avoiding arguments that a failure to honour an award only arises upon an unequivocal breach of the award debtor’s contractual obligation to pay. 

Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal relating to section 6(1)(c) of the LA failed. 

Significance of decision 

This decision reinforces the importance of paying close attention to statutory limitation periods, not just in the commencement of actions but also in the enforcement of awards or judgments. Award creditors should take note that actions to enforce an award must be brought within six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, and that this would usually coincide with the date of the award. The respondent in this case was only successful because it had filed the Recognition Application just before the expiry of the relevant limitation period. 

Reference materials 

The judgment is available on the Singapore Courts website www.judiciary.gov.sg.